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I would like to begin by expressing my thanks to the CPA for the honour of inviting 
me to deliver the annual Research Lecture in Government Accounting. When I look 
over the list of speakers from previous years, I realise I am in most distinguished 
company. The subject of this lecture is accountability in a contemporary public sector.  
Accountability, of course, is the core value of your own accounting and auditing 
professions.  Academics, such as myself, who work on accountability without the 
benefit of an accounting background, are constantly reminded of the central role 
played by financial accounting and accountants in the practice of public sector 
accountability.  Indeed, financial accountability is at the very heart of our constitution 
in the core relationship between Parliament, which authorises revenue and 
expenditure, and the executive which recommends, spends and reports on expenditure. 
With respect to the details of financial accountability, there is much more that I can 
learn from you than you from me.  What I will try to do, however, is to help place 
current public accounting trends in a broader political and administrative context.  In 
this way, I hope, some light can be thrown on some of the more specific day-to-day 
issues that you face in your professional lives. 
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Accountability issues are always pressing and problematic. From the general 
public’s perspective, attention usually focuses on what is really the final stage in the 
accountability process, the need to rectify mistakes and failures once they have been 
brought to light.  Most citizens have better things to do with their lives than to bother 
with the daily routines of government reporting.  But they quickly take angry note 
when things go wrong. Accountability becomes associated with demands for remedies 
and resignations, often unheeded.  In the clamour of the moment, it easy to be 
convinced that standards are slipping and that accountability is at risk. It is equally 
easy to ignore the underlying processes and structures of accountability which 
generate the very information which rightly shocks the public.  Moreover, 
concentration on the scandals of the moment may obscure the way in which 
accountability mechanisms have altered significantly over the last generation, often 
for the better, though not invariably so.   
In this lecture, I will begin by sketching two general trends which have 
significantly reshaped the accountability landscape over the last thirty years or so (see 
Mulgan 2003, ch1).  One is an accountability movement which sought to supplement 
traditional conventions of ministerial responsibility; the other is the managerialist 
movement, often known as the ‘New Public Management’.  I will then discuss in 
greater detail two more specific issues which are the subject of my ongoing research, 
the impact of the new financial reporting framework and that of outsourcing on the 




The first general trend has been a demand for greater transparency and a deliberate 
erosion of the public service anonymity associated with traditional ministerial 
responsibility.  Ministerial responsibility, in its classic formulation, requires that 
ministers take collective responsibility for the activities of their departments, 
particularly in the sense that they answer questions from the public and undertake any 
necessary rectification when mistakes come to light.  The traditional corollary was 
that departmental public servants remained anonymous, leaving the minister to be the 
sole public face of the department.  All information to the public was to come through 
the minister, even about relatively minor administrative matters in which the minister 
was not directly involved. Such anonymity, it was claimed, was necessary to protect 
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the professional neutrality of the public service, by shielding it from political 
controversy.  Anonymity also allowed public servants to report frankly and fearlessly 
to their political masters in the confidence that their words could not be used by the 
government’s political opponents as ammunition to embarrass the government.  More 
broadly, the obligation on ministers to take public ownership of departmental 
activities helped to cement the principle of political control. If the minister was the 
person carrying the can in public, all the more reason for public servants to make sure 
that they accepted the minister’s authority throughout the department.   
None of this, of course, implied that ministers should be seen to take personal 
responsibility for all departmental activities, let alone be expected to resign on 
account of the failures of their subordinates.  The principle of vicarious responsibility 
that ministers should resign for matters beyond their immediate control or knowledge, 
has never been part of  the conventions of ministerial responsibility, either here or in 
any other Westminster jurisdiction.  It survives only as popular mythology, kept alive 
by opportunistic politicians and ignorant commentators.  The key is that ministers are 
the public faces of their departments and do not disown collective responsibility, in 
much the same away as company CEOs or school principals are the public faces of 
their respective organisations.   
The convention that public servants remain anonymous and leave all public 
accountability to their ministers has never been applied in all respects.  One 
longstanding exception, which dates back to nineteenth-century practice in 
Westminster, concerns the right of Parliament and it officers to investigate 
government finances and to directly question public servants about the propriety of 
their financial dealings.  Public accounts committees, in association with auditors-
general, have long had the right to go behind or around the relevant ministers in order 
to test whether Parliament’s financial authority has been respected.  Once again, we 
notice the centrality of financial appropriation to government accountability.  But 
beyond the strictly financial sphere, until the last third of the twentieth century, 
ministers tended to monopolise accountability, not only for matters of general 
government policy but also for matters of detailed administrative decision.  The 
disadvantages from the public’s point of view, were manifest.  It was highly 
unsatisfactory to rely on an approach via a minister to get information about a matter 
of public importance or to seek redress for administrative incompetence.  By enabling 
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public servants to hide behind a veil of anonymity, ministerial responsibility became 
seen as a means of protecting public servants from legitimate public inquiry.    
Beginning in the 1970s a whole range of reforms came into force that broke 
down much of the protective veil.  Parliamentary committees, particularly Senate 
committees in the Commonwealth Parliament, began to interrogate departmental 
officials directly and in public about a whole range of government activities.  The 
financial estimates have often provided the official umbrella, but the questioning has 
mostly not been about strictly financial matters.  In addition, a bunch of initiatives, 
loosely categorised under the title ‘New Administrative Law’, opened administrative 
decisions up to independent scrutiny. Ombudsmen and administrative appeal tribunals 
offered citizens opportunities to contest adverse administrative decisions. Freedom of 
Information laws allowed access to both personal and general information.   
These innovations occurred, at somewhat different speeds, throughout the 
‘Westminster world’, that is the UK itself and also Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand.  All involved importations from beyond Westminster borders – ombudsmen 
from Scandinavia, committee investigations and freedom of information from the 
United States.  All were opposed at the time by traditionalists who complained that 
they would undermine ministerial responsibility, which was, of course, the intention.  
By and large, however, the main assumptions of ministerial responsibility have been 
maintained.  The greater visibility of public servants may have made it easier for 
ministers to engage in public blame-shifting to officials.  But ministers, both 
individually and collectively through the cabinet, still retain sole responsibility for 
government ‘policy’ which is flexibly interpreted to mean anything to which ministers 
are personally committed.  (The style of furniture in the prime ministerial office can 
become a matter of policy if the Prime Minister so chooses.)  Parliamentary 
questioning of departmental officials allows them the right not to comment on 
government policy.  Disclosure under Freedom of Information has allowed exemption 
for cabinet papers canvassing policy options, thus privileging confidential 
communication between ministers and their senior officials.  Investigation of 
decisions, via the Ombudsmen or tribunals, focuses on genuine matters of 
administration where the decisions have clearly been made by officials implementing 
existing legislation or preset policy.   
Many of these new avenues of transparency remain contested and, arguably, 
are too dependent on executive discretion.  For instance, the extended right of Senate 
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inquiry, which has been such a major innovation in recent decades, is now under 
serous threat because the non-government parties no longer control the Senate.  What 
the community may have looked on as a robustly entrenched convention of 
parliamentary investigation is now revealed as conditional on the contingencies of 
party numbers.  Again, Freedom of Information law also allows the government 
considerable latitude in what it chooses to reveal. A recent High Court decision has 
upheld the Treasurer’s right to impose public-interest restrictions on Treasury 
research into the effects of ‘bracket creep’ (when pay increases move taxpayers into 
higher tax brackets) and of the cash grant for first-home buyers. Arguments given 
against releasing the documents included claims that such a decision would damage 
the Treasury’s ability to communicate in writing with the Treasurer on sensitive issues 
and that the documents were too technical to be understood by the public (The 
Australian 22 July 2004).  There seems little doubt, however, that a major reason for 
suppression was that the reports contained information that could have cast doubt on 
the effectiveness of government policy.  We can be confident that if the conclusions 
had favoured the government’s line, the research would not have remained secret for 
long. 
Even so, we should not allow continuing and inevitable controversy over the 
boundaries of government secrecy to obscure the much more important fact that the 
boundaries themselves have shifted decisively in the public’s favour.  The overall 
effect has been to greatly increase the transparency of government. The notion that 
government speaks with one voice, that of the minister, is now thoroughly 
undermined.  Comparing the level of secrecy surrounding  the public service forty 
years ago with that pertaining now, leaves one in little doubt that today’s officials are 




The second major trend that has reshaped the accountability landscape is associated 
with the movement known variously as the ‘New Public Management’ or 
‘managerialism’ that swept through the Westminster world in the 1980s and 1990s.  
While the earlier movement for greater transparency was driven mainly by small ‘l’ 
liberals with a constitutional agenda, the managerialist trend was an offshoot of the 
neo-liberal shift in economic policy.  A general suspicion of government intervention 
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and a preference for economic markets as means of delivering social goods led to a 
redrawing of the boundaries between the public and the private sectors.  A number of 
key functions, previously considered to be the preserve of government providers, 
were wholly or partially privatised.  Within the remaining public sector itself, 
methods of organisation and control were revolutionised by the importation of private 
sector management principles.  The very concept of management itself was new, 
bringing an emphasis on decision-making rather than rule-following.   
New also was the attention given to defining the purposes of government 
activities and to measuring performance in terms of specific objectives. Concentration 
on objectives, in turn, paved the way for the significant extension of the audit function.  
In addition to their traditional focus on financial verification and compliance, 
government auditors have become heavily engaged in assessing performance through 
value-for-money or performance auditing. This enables auditors to evaluate 
government programs in terms of their efficiency and effectiveness in meeting stated 
objectives.   
As you will know, the new emphasis on objectives and private sector 
management tools also transformed government accounting.  Program budgeting in 
the early 1990s was followed by the outcome/output framework of the late 1990s.  
Public sector budgeting and financial reporting were refocused away from inputs and 
line items and towards results. In addition, the introduction of accrual accounting 
from the private sector helped to bring a more accurate picture of the value of 
government assets and of future liabilities.   
If the managerialist revolution was primarily about improving efficiency and 
effectiveness, getting more bang for the government buck, it also clearly carried an 
accountability agenda.  In the first place, there was an attempted change in the subject 
matter or content of government accountability, what government agencies and 
officials are accountable for.  As already mentioned, governments are now much more 
accountable for results and performance in terms of defined objectives.  At the same 
time, managerialist critics of traditional public administration objected to the public 
sector focus on controlling inputs and on following due process, seeing it as a cause of 
inefficiency.  If managers were held properly accountable for achieved results, then 
they should be held less accountable for the steps they took along the way.   
However, though much internal red tape has certainly been reduced, the public 
sector still remains subject to significantly higher process standards than the private 
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sector.  The reason is not to be located in public service inertia. Indeed public servants 
themselves often chafe at process restrictions as much as do the private sector critics.  
The main driver behind the concern for public sector process is public opinion and 
taxpayer interest in how public funds are spent.  A recent item from the Canberra 
Times provides a typical illustration.  The headline screams: ‘CSIRO staff in $70,000 
trip; taxpayers fund magician’s tropical gig’ (1 September 2005).  The news story 
below goes on to describe a response to a question at Senate Estimates which elicited 
information about a CSIRO conference for science communicators held at South 
Stradbroke Island.  As part of the conference program, conference members were 
entertained by a professional magician who charged a fee of $500 plus travel and 
accommodation.  Would similar expenditure by a private sector company warrant a 
similar headline?  Very unlikely.   
The other attempted shift in the structure of accountability has been in the 
directions or channels of accountability.  The managerialist reformers were critical of 
political channels of accountability as they operated through traditional ministerial 
responsibility.  But their criticism was directed not so much at the secrecy engendered 
by ministerial responsibility as at the scope for ministerial intervention in the detailed 
implementation of policy.  Giving ministers formal responsibility for all departmental 
decisions provided them with an incentive to meddle in day-to-day administration. 
This, in turn, helped to make public servants risk-averse and process-driven because 
they were fearful of causing political damage to their political masters.  It would be 
better to make politicians accountable only for determining policy and general 
objectives. The implementation of policy would be left to separate, arms-length 
executive agencies or private contactors whose managers would be separately 
accountable. 
Again, traditional public expectations have to some extent frustrated this hoped-
for reduction in political accountability.  Where public services have been totally 
privatised, as with Qantas or the Commonwealth Bank, political accountability has 
certainly been cut right back, though politicians can still find themselves accountable 
for the regulatory environment.  The case of outsourcing, where government uses 
private contractors to provide publicly funded services, is more complex and I will 
return to later in the lecture.  Within government itself, however, the introduction of 
executive agencies such as Centrelink has not significantly altered the chain of 
accountability.  In the first flush of separating purchasing from providing, ministers 
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may have been tempted to dodge questions about detailed administration and pass 
them on to the provider agencies (Mulgan 2002). But the public is generally intolerant 
on matters of blame-shifting or buck-passing.  Whoever is providing a government 
service, whether a government department or an arms-length agency, ultimate 




So much for a general overview of how the accountability landscape has been 
reshaped (and how far it continues unchanged).  Now to look at a two, more specific 
issues in more detail.  The first is a topic which will be of particular interest to the 
members of this audience: the effectiveness of the new financial reporting structure as 
an accountability mechanism. As I admitted earlier, I am no accounting expert and 
would defer to your greater technical expertise in the intricacies of both accrual and 
outcome/output-based budgeting. I do, however, at least know the logical difference 
between the two, which is more than can be said for many politicians, journalists and 
even public servants.  It is very common to read or hear remarks such as ‘under an 
accrual-based system, one has to report expenditure under outputs and outcomes 
rather than inputs’ or ‘under outcome/output-based budgeting, one must list all future 
liabilities’.  Admittedly, we have introduced both accrual and outcome/output-based 
budgeting together. But few seem to understand that they are different and that we 
could have had one without the other.  We could have introduced output budgeting 
while continuing on a cash rather than accrual basis. Alternatively, we could have 
brought in accrual budgeting but joined it on to input rather than output budgeting.    
This is no doubt Government Accounting 101 but the lack of general 
understanding may be symptomatic of a wider problem.  While the new financial 
accounting framework may mark some technical advances in government accounting 
and financial management, has it improved the wider accountability of government to 
the general public?  I will not enter here into the well-trodden debate over accrual 
accounting and its applicability to government expenditure, on which I have little to 
add to the views of the experts (eg Guthrie 1999).  Certainly, assessing the value of 
certain public capital assets has led to better management of government property and 
resources.  At the same time, there are clearly limits to treating all public assets as 
capital which should yield a given return.  In addition, bringing future commitments 
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into general public debate about the annual budget should, in principle, lead to more 
informed public discussion and better financial accountability.   
In passing, we might ruefully note the prominence accrual accounting gives to 
public servants’ future superannuation as having the first call on future budgets.  
Keeping ex-public servants in comfortable retirement now appears more important 
public policy than providing our children and grand-children with basic public 
services.  Accrual accounting is providing useful ammunition for those who like to 
depict public servants as leaches on the public purse, concerned more for their own 
comfort than for the public welfare.   Information is rarely politically neutral. 
The other aspect of the new framework, the output/outcome structure, has been 
less subject to detailed analysis.  At a general level, organising the activities of 
individual agencies around particular outcomes and then particular outputs targeted at 
these outcomes must help to instill a greater concern for objectives and results.  In this 
respect, the framework is reinforcing the results-based focus rightly championed by 
the managerialist reformers.  But beyond this general effect on organisational culture 
and psychology, is the framework being used to deliver the type of strategic control 
and internal accountability that its proponents were looking for?  Do public service 
managers base their decision-making on how best to achieve the outputs and 
outcomes as specified in their budget?  Or are they guided by a more shifting and 
subtle political environment than can be encapsulated into a brief statement of 
objectives?   In other words, is the budgetary framework the guiding strategic 
document, as it would be for a private sector manager?  Or is it effectively a side-
show, dutifully drawn up to satisfy the requirements from DOFA, but otherwise 
ignored in the day-to-day decision-making?   
Anecdotal evidence suggests a degree of scepticism about the process in the 
upper echelons of the APS, but there is little hard data so far.  One suspects that the 
answer varies with the agency and its type of remit.  In general, managers in line 
departments charged with implementing specific programs are more likely to focus on 
meeting stated objectives linked to given budgetary targets.  On the other hand, those 
engaged in policy formulation and advice operate in too fluid an environment for their 
tasks to be usefully directed towards achieving set targets.  
The new framework was intended not only to improve internal accountability 
within executive branch of government but also to assist accountability to the wider 
public by giving Parliament better information about the performance of individual 
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government agencies.  Here, again, the results have been patchy.  Much of the 
performance information reported to Parliament is actually of little public interest and 
remains largely unread.  One way of assessing what actually interests the public and 
its elected representatives is to study the types of questions asked at Senate Estimates 
Committees. I am myself embarked on a research study, funded by the Australian 
Research Council, which analyses the topics pursued at Estimates Committees for a 
sample of agencies in selected years over a twenty-year period.   The purpose is to 
discover the accountability priorities of politicians, and by inference to throw light on 
the issues that engage the voters.  Allowance must be made, of course, for the partisan 
motivations of politicians, on both the Opposition and the Government sides.  None 
the less, the type of question pursued by Senators, particularly when focusing directly 
on the performance of the public service, can give an indication of what aspects of 
government performance are thought to be of particular concern.  One purpose of the 
research is to examine how far the new budgeting and reporting framework is actually 
assisting committee members in their investigations.   
The research is only in its early stages but the results so far are not very 
encouraging for those who saw the new framework as a means of improving public 
accountability.   Though agency budget estimates provide the official agenda for 
questioning, very few questions make any explicit reference to information provided 
in the budget papers or in annual reports.  Only 10 per cent of committee time is taken 
up with questions on departmental papers. For the rest, committee members proceed 
directly to matters that are not referred to in the official documentation.   For the most 
part, the level of detail sought by politicians is not available in the budget statements 
and reports.  Politicians tend to concentrate on particular aspects of policy or even 
particular cases rather than general trends.  They may want to probe the performance 
of a particular section of an agency, such as an individual embassy or Centrelink 
office, or the administration of a particular policy, such as one of the disability 
pensions.  Moreover, they are often interested in what are technically matters of input 
and process, in who has spent how much on what, rather than the final outcome.  
Witness the hapless CSIRO conference at South Stradbroke Island, which caught the 
recent headlines. All eyes were on the cost and the magician.  No one was asking 
what the conference might have achieved in terms of improved performance for the 
Organisation.    
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On the public service side, many would argue that politicians and the media 
have the wrong priorities, that they are too concerned with detail and miss the big 
picture; that they are obsessed with ferreting out instances of apparent public service 
extravagance and not enough focused on the final results.  Indeed, in some of the 
justifications given for the new structure when it was introduced, one could  detect an 
attempt by officials to re-educate politicians away from their traditional interest in 
scandalous detail.  However, from a democratic point of view, it can be argued that 
the people and their representatives have the right to decide what aspects of 
government activity they want to get agitated about.  The public, like customers, are 
never wrong.   
Moreover, officials may well have their own less than reputable reasons for 
claiming that the public should be concerned only about outcomes and outputs, such 
as the quality of service actually provided.  It suits officials to think that public have 
no interest in details of how these services are provided, such as how many public 
servants flew to what exotic destinations in the process of delivering their outputs, and 
whether they flew first class or business class rather than economy. At any rate, 
whatever the rights and wrongs of the politicians’ accountability priorities, the general 
conclusion remains: the new reporting framework has done little to assist them in 




A second area of accountability tension relates to the outsourcing of public services to 
private providers. Outsourcing has always been a part of government practice, 
because no government has the capacity in its own ranks to meet all the demands 
placed upon it.  But the extent of outsourcing increased greatly as part of the new 
public management movement.  At the Commonwealth level, the highpoint of the 
outsourcing trend was in the mid to late 1990s (Hodge 1998). It was driven by an 
ideological conviction that private sector provision was inherently more efficient (and 
opposed by an equally ideological conviction that traditional public sector provision 
was superior).  The Humphry Report (Humphry 2000) into IT outsourcing in 2000 
marked something of a watershed, helping to replace ideology with pragmatism. The 
decision whether or not to outsource is now seen to depend on what will work best in 
any given situation.  This approach, that neither public nor private provision is 
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inherently superior, is now becoming common ground on both sides of politics 
internationally.  As right-of-centre parties have drawn back from a blindly ideological 
preference for private provision, the left has also started to embrace pragmatism.  
Indeed, the defining position of what has become known as New Labour is its 
openness to the private sector. 
From the beginning, outsourcing has raised particular problems for public 
accountability. Indeed, the whole issue of how far governments are accountable for 
outsourced services has been the subject of continuing disagreement.  On the one 
hand, advocates of outsourcing have steadfastly maintained that governments remain 
as accountable for outsourced services as they are for services provided in-house 
(Industry Commission 1995).  Outsourcing, it has been argued, may devolve 
responsibility but not accountability.   The Commonwealth Government response to 
the Report on Contract Management by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and 
Audit may be taken as a considered expression of current government policy: 
‘agencies remain accountable for the delivery of services even where the service 
delivery is provided by the private sector (Senate Hansard 14 May 2002, 1382).  At 
the same time, however, expert commentators such as the former Auditor-General 
(Barrett 2001, 2004), have pointed out that accountability is significantly reduced 
under outsourcing.   
The expert commentators are unquestionably correct.  There is an undoubted 
accountability deficit when services outsourced.  Private contractors are not subject to 
the same range of accountability mechanisms as public service departments.  They are 
not directly interrogated by parliamentary committees; they are not automatically 
subject to the jurisdiction of the ombudsman or the auditor-general; individual 
citizens, not being party to contracts between the government and the service provider, 
are denied certain rights of legal redress that would be available to them in relation to 
government agencies.  
Moreover, even when private providers are subject to accountability 
mechanisms, the range of matters which can be inquired into is significantly reduced.  
Many aspects of the outsourcing arrangement itself are treated as commercially 
confidential and beyond the range of public inquiry. The rationale for secrecy is that 
contracts contain commercially sensitive information which, if revealed, could 
damage the interest of the contractors in relation to their competitors.  However, as is 
well known, much of the information claimed to be commercially confidential does 
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not have such a damaging potential.  Complaints about the misuse of commercial 
confidentiality from government auditors and parliamentary committees have in fact 
pared back some of the secrecy surrounding outsourcing contracts.  It is now widely 
agreed that private sector companies contracting with governments must accept a 
higher degree of public scrutiny than normal.   
Interestingly, however, disputes over commercial confidentiality tend to centre 
on access to information about what governments have done, over how much they 
have paid to whom and for what.  How individual contractors themselves carry out 
their contracts is looked on as their own affair and as not a matter of public interest, 
even though taxpayers’ funds are involved.  The type of fierce scrutiny given to 
public servants’ expenditure over items such as travel expenses is not extended to 
members of private contracting firms.  Contractors are free to swan off to South 
Stradbroke Island and to hire whole troupes of magicians, no questions asked.  
Under outsourcing, public oversight is also reduced over conditions of 
employment. While appointment to positions in the public service is subject to 
principles of merit appointment, private contractors are not generally subject to the 
same expectations.  Contract cleaners, for instance, are often employed on the basis of 
family or other personal connections even though public funds are the ultimate source 
of their wages.  Indeed, freedom from public employment conditions is one of the 
main sources of savings from outsourcing, particularly in the less skilled functions 
such as cleaning, gardening and rubbish collection (Industry Commission 1996).     
In certain major respects, then, the scope of accountability, is definitely 
reduced through outsourcing.  However, the matters removed from scrutiny, such as 
levels of expenditure and employment conditions, tend to concern the means by 
which the service is provided and the manner in which it is provided, rather than the 
quality of the service itself.  That is, the accountability deficit is centred primarily on 
inputs and processes rather than on outputs and outcomes.   In this case, the 
government’s claim to 'remain accountable for the delivery of services even when the 
service delivery is provided by the private sector' should be understood to refer 
primarily to the end product, the quality of the service itself. Ministers and senior 
public servants may lack the level of direct control over contractors that they exercise 
over their own agencies.  However, their claim to retain accountability can be taken as 
an assurance not to use outsourcing as a excuse for passing the buck on outputs.  Just 
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because a service is outsourced does not mean that ministers can publicly disown 
ultimate responsibility.  
As mentioned earlier, one of the general lessons from the new public 
management has been that the public will not tolerate government blame-shifting and 
buck-passing to arms-length providers.  Not that ministers do not occasionally engage 
in blame-shifting to subordinates.  We have recently witnessed some controversial 
instances in the case of the Department of Immigration where the Minister has been 
severely criticised (and also vigorously defended) for not taking her alleged share of 
the blame.  The point for the present argument, however, is that the Minister was 
accused of blame shifting to public servants.  We have not, in the Immigration area, 
seen any attempt by ministers to single out contractors for buck passing. They have 
not sought to accept less responsibility for the actions of private contractors, such as 
the corrections management firms, than for their own departmental officials.  
Ministers recognise that such explicit distancing from private contractors will not 
wash with the public.  If the government sets the terms of the contact and selects the 
contractors it must accept the consequences. 
Accountability demands from the public are thus requiring government to 
accept the principle that they are accountable for the quality of outsourced services.  
This is a corollary of the pragmatic approach to the question of public or private 
provision.  If the choice between public and private providers is purely a matter of 
comparative efficiency over the end result, the public will expect public 
accountability for the result regardless of that choice.  However, this principle 
presents governments with a new element of added risk, given that they cannot 
exercise the same degree of control over contractors, as they can over their own 
departmental officials.  Not surprisingly, governments are trying to reduce the level of 
risk by increasing the extent of control and accountability over contractors.  Hence the 
recommendation that contracts should provide access for Auditors-General to the 
contractors’ financial records.  Hence, too, the practice of including in some service 
contracts a requirement that the contractor abide by public service values as specified 
in the Public Service Act.  In a politically sensitive service such as the Job Network, 
contractors have also been made subject to a departmental grievance procedure.  This 
procedure, in turn, allows recourse to the Commonwealth Ombudsman, thus 
circumventing the exclusion of private contractors from the Ombudsman’s 
jurisdiction.   
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In these ways, governments are attempting to reduce the accountability deficit 
in order to make good their claim of equal accountability for publicly and privately 
provided services.  The extent of any remaining deficit is the subject of another 
research project in which I am engaged with a colleague from Monash University, 
Professor Graeme Hodge, and which is funded by the Australian Research Council in 
conjunction with the Australian National Audit Office. Some accountability gaps 
between the two sectors will still remain and are probably sufficient to prevent the 
outsourcing of the most sensitive and risky services, such as tax assessments or 
pension entitlements.  But we should not forget that twenty years ago no-one would 
have contemplated the outsourcing of the security of government buildings.  Today, 
however, private security firms guard the entrance to just about every government 




In conclusion, I hope to have demonstrated that accountability issues remain complex 
and contested.  In some respects, the extent of public accountability has diminished, 
with the reduction in the size of the public sector itself and the transfer of some 
functions to private organisations.  But within the remaining public sector, the level of 
accountability has generally increased, True, there are continuing disputes at the 
edges but these, in part, are the result of greater transparency.  The more information 
the public and their representatives have access to, the more their curiosity is raised 
about what is being kept concealed.  In terms of the well-known catch-phrase, ‘As the 
circle of light increases so does the circumference of darkness that surrounds it.’ The 
more we know, the more we know we don’t know and the more we want to find out 
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